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Abstract
Background: The impact of reducing door-to-balloon time on hospital revenues, costs, and net income
is unknown.
Methods: We prospectively determined the impact on hospital finances of (1) emergency department
physician activation of the catheterization lab and (2) immediate transfer of the patient to an immediately
available catheterization lab by an in-house transfer team consisting of an emergency department nurse, a
critical care unit nurse, and a chest pain unit nurse. We collected financial data for 52 consecutive ST-
elevation myocardial infarction patients undergoing emergency percutaneous intervention from October
1, 2004–August 31, 2005 and compared this group to 80 consecutive ST-elevation myocardial infarction
patients from September 1, 2005–June 26, 2006 after protocol implementation.
Results: Per hospital admission, insurance payments (hospital revenue) decreased ($35,043 ± $36,670 vs.
$25,329 ± $16,185, P = 0.039) along with total hospital costs ($28,082 ± $31,453 vs. $18,195 ± $9,242, P
= 0.009). Hospital net income per admission was unchanged ($6962 vs. $7134, P = 0.95) as the drop in
hospital revenue equaled the drop in costs. For every $1000 reduction in total hospital costs, insurance
payments (hospital revenue) dropped $1077 for private payers and $1199 for Medicare/Medicaid. A
decrease in hospital charges ($70,430 ± $74,033 vs. $53,514 ± $23,378, P = 0.059), diagnosis related group
relative weight (3.7479 ± 2.6731 vs. 2.9729 ± 0.8545, P = 0.017) and outlier payments with hospital
revenue>$100,000 (7.7% vs. 0%, P = 0.022) all contributed to decreasing ST-elevation myocardial
infarction hospitalization revenue. One-year post-discharge financial follow-up revealed similar results:
Insurance payments: $49,959 ± $53,741 vs. $35,937 ± $23,125, P = 0.044; Total hospital costs: $39,974 ±
$37,434 vs. $26,778 ± $15,561, P = 0.007; Net Income: $9984 vs. $9159, P = 0.855.
Conclusion: All of the financial benefits of reducing door-to-balloon time in ST-elevation myocardial
infarction go to payers both during initial hospitalization and after one-year follow-up.
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Background
The quality of health care by physicians and hospitals has
received increasing interest due to well-documented defi-
ciencies in the care delivered to patients [1]. Initially, this
interest focused on public reporting of definitive out-
comes such as mortality in patients undergoing coronary
artery bypass grafting [2]. More recently, attention has
shifted to markers of quality of care such as prescription
rates for evidence-based drug therapies, documentation of
education efforts for smoking and heart failure, and
adherence to processes such as proper timing of antibiotic
administration [3]. Interest in hospital quality reporting
accelerated rapidly with implementation of the Hospital
Quality Initiative by the Centers for Medicare and Medic-
aid Services (CMS). This program initially requested vol-
untary submission of 10 quality measures with the caveat
that non-submission would result in a 0.4% decrease in
Medicare payments. Participation in this program has
been nearly universal with 99% of acute care hospitals
submitting data to CMS, and the program has now
evolved to include submission of 21 quality measures
with future plans for additional measures [4].
It is widely assumed that improving the quality of care
will decrease the cost of care. For example, the Leapfrog
Group has asserted that adoption of care patterns found at
high quality and efficient hospitals could save the health-
care system $5.6 billion dollars on the care of patients
with acute myocardial infarction [5]. Similarly at the hos-
pital level, some have advocated that there is a "business
case" for quality, presuming that improved quality is asso-
ciated with decreased hospital costs and improved hospi-
tal profitability [6-9]. However, these associations are not
proof of a causal link between improved quality and
decreased cost of care. In fact, at a broad level, there is a
surprising paucity of research studying the causal relation-
ship between improvements in the quality of care and the
cost of care [10,11].
This increased focus on hospital quality reporting has par-
ticularly impacted cardiac care as measures involving
myocardial infarction and congestive heart failure have
received particular emphasis [3]. Of these specific meas-
ures, rapid door-to-balloon time in ST-elevation myocar-
dial infarction (STEMI) is one of the most difficult to
achieve, with most patients nationwide not achieving the
recommended time of 90 minutes [12]. However, recent
reports have highlighted specific strategies that can be
implemented to reduce door-to-balloon time [13]. We
recently showed that emergency department physician
activation of the catheterization lab combined with a
novel strategy of immediate transfer of the patient to an
immediately available catheterization lab by in-house
nursing staff reduces door-to-balloon time, leading to a
reduction in myocardial infarct size and hospital length of
stay [14]. In this report, we sought to determine whether
this improvement in quality led to changes in the cost of
care and whether the cost savings benefited payers or hos-
pitals.
Methods
Study Design
Patient enrollment was conducted between October 1,
2004 and June 26, 2006 at St. Francis Hospital and Health
Center (Beech Grove and Indianapolis, IN), a 591-bed ter-
tiary care community hospital consisting of two cam-
puses. We prospectively enrolled consecutive patients
who presented to either Beech Grove or Indianapolis
emergency department with STEMI who received percuta-
neous intervention within 24 hours of presentation [3].
On September 1, 2005 at 7:00 AM, we implemented a
protocol mandating (1) emergency department physician
activation of the catheterization lab and (2) immediate
transfer of the patient to an immediately available cathe-
terization lab by an in-house Emergency Heart Attack
Response Team (EHART®), consisting of an emergency
department nurse, a critical care unit nurse, and a chest
pain unit nurse [14].
Financial Analysis
Financial data from patients treated prior to the process
change (Cardiology Activation/Routine Transfer period:
October 1, 2004–August 30, 2005) were compared with
financial data from patients treated after the process
change (ED Activation/Immediate Transfer period: Sep-
tember 1, 2005–June 26, 2006). Revenue and cost data for
all patients (including outliers) were analyzed. Hospital
revenue indicates actual payments received from payers
and is current as of September 2007 for initial hospitaliza-
tion data and as of January 2008 for one-year financial
data. Hospital cost data reflect the actual costs involved in
the delivery of care to each patient and were determined
by the hospital's cost-accounting software (Alliance for
Decision Support, Avega. El Segundo, California). Both
direct and indirect costs were determined. Contribution
margin equaled revenue minus direct costs. Net income
equaled revenue minus both direct and indirect costs.
The primary analysis included all patients with private
insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid to focus on the finan-
cial data at the payer-hospital interface. Self-pay patients
were excluded from the primary analysis, but were
included in a secondary analysis (see Additional file 1).
Financial data were stratified by payer status (private and
Medicare/Medicaid) and were compared between the two
time periods. Medicare and Medicaid were combined into
one group as the number of Medicaid patients was small.
Diagnosis related groups (DRG) were determined for allBMC Cardiovascular Disorders 2009, 9:32 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2261/9/32
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patients and standardized to reflect 2006 groupings. The
DRG relative weight was determined for all patients.
These were analyzed in unadjusted fashion and also ana-
lyzed after standardization to reflect fiscal 2006 values.
Outlier payments were defined as hospital charges
>$100,000 and hospital revenue >$100,000 and were
compared between the two time periods. One-year fol-
low-up was performed by combining financial data from
the initial hospitalization with data from all hospital
encounters (inpatient and outpatient) in the one-year
post-hospital discharge. For patients with multiple hospi-
talizations for STEMI, the initial hospitalization was used
as the index event and the subsequent hospitalization was
included in the one-year financial follow-up data.
Statistical Analysis
The statistical analysis plan was pre-specified prior to for-
mal data analysis [14]. Time values are presented as medi-
ans with inter-quartile ranges and were analyzed using
two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. Cost data are pre-
sented as mean ± standard deviation and were analyzed
by two sample t-tests [15]. Categorical data are presented
as proportions and were analyzed by Fisher's exact test. P
< 0.05 was considered statistically significant. Stata Soft-
ware was used for statistical analyses (version 8.2, College
Station, Texas). Our institutional review board approved
the study. The authors had full access to the data, take
responsibility for its integrity, and have read and agree to
the manuscript as written.
Results
The two cohorts had well-matched demographics, initial
presentation characteristics, and treatments as noted in
the original paper http://circ.ahajournals.org/cgi/content/
full/116/1/67[14]. Median door-to-balloon time
decreased overall (113.5 minutes vs. 75.5 minutes, P <
0.0001), and treatment within 90 minutes increased from
28% to 71% (P < 0.0001). Mean infarct size decreased
(Peak creatinine kinase: 2623 ± 3329 IU/L vs. 1517 ±
1556 IU/L, P = 0.0089), as did hospital length of stay (5 ±
7 days vs. 3 ± 2 days, P = 0.0097) [14].
The pattern of insurance coverage was similar (Table 1). In
the primary analysis, hospital charges and hospital reve-
nue both decreased with ED Activation/Immediate Trans-
fer. Total hospital costs, direct hospital costs, and indirect
hospital costs all decreased. A similar pattern was seen
when the data was stratified by private insurance and
Medicare/Medicaid status although the results were not
statistically significant in the latter group due to small
sample size (Table 1). The decrease in hospital revenue
was greater than the decrease in hospital costs leading to
a decrease in net income when stratified by payer status
(private insurance and Medicare/Medicaid). For every
$1000 reduction in total hospital costs, insurance pay-
ments (hospital revenue) dropped $1077 for private pay-
ers and $1199 for Medicare/Medicaid. However, there was
slight numerical increase in overall hospital net income
per admission due to a numerical increase in the propor-
tion of private insurance patients.
The pattern of assigned DRG's for each admission was
similar (Table 2). However, with implementation of the
ED Activation/Immediate Transfer quality improvement,
the DRG relative weight (which determines formal pay-
ment from Medicare) decreased significantly. The
decrease was seen even when the data were standardized
to reflect fiscal 2006 DRG relative weights. Similar pat-
terns were seen when stratified by private insurance and
Medicare/Medicaid. There was a reduction in outlier pay-
ments with the proportion of patients with hospital
charges >$100,000 and hospital revenue >$100,000 both
decreasing (Figure 1).
Patients were assigned “surgery” DRG’s not only for
CABG, but also for ventricular assist device placement
(DRG 103), mitral valve replacement (DRG 104), and
intra-aortic balloon pump placement (DRG 110) (Figure
2 and Table 3). The proportion of patients undergoing
CABG for complete revascularization in the absence of
cardiogenic shock was similar (7.7% vs. 2.5%, P = 0.166).
The exclusion of these patients undergoing CABG for
complete revascularization in the absence of cardiogenic
shock did not impact our conclusions as there remained
significant decreases in insurance payments, total hospital
costs, and diagnosis related group relative weight (Insur-
ance payments: $34,499 ± $37,919 vs. $24,888 ±
$15,265, P = 0.048; Total hospital costs: $27,060 ±
$32,391 vs. $17,789 ± $8975, P = 0.018; Net Income:
$7440 vs. $7099, P = 0.902; Diagnosis related group rela-
tive weight: 3.4514 ± 2.5663 vs. 2.8687 ± 0.5564, P =
0.055). These results were consistent with the primary
analysis indicating that a numerical difference in patients
requiring CABG for complete revascularization in the
absence of cardiogenic shock could not explain our
results.
The Medicare base rate to our hospital increased by 2.4%
($5171 in fiscal 2005 to $5297 in fiscal 2006) while pri-
vate payer contracted payment rates increased in the range
of 6–8% per year over the course of our study. Thus, our
large decrease in actual hospital revenue per patient
(Table 1 – a 36% decrease from Medicare/Medicaid and a
29% decrease for Private Payers) occurred even though
there was a modest increase in the payment rates from
government and private payers. Thus, the decreasing
intensity of care associated with improved door-to-bal-
loon time (i.e. reduced DRG Relative Weight, reduced
charges, reduced outliers) was the primary determinant of
reduced insurance payments.BMC Cardiovascular Disorders 2009, 9:32 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2261/9/32
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Table 1: Health Insurance Status, Hospital Revenues, Costs, and Profit Margins
Cardiology Activation
Routine Transfer
October 1, 2004–August 31, 2005
(N = 60)
ED Activation
Immediate Transfer
September 1, 2005–June 26, 2006
(N = 86)
N N P Value
Health Insurance 60 86
Private 28 (46.7) 48 (55.8) 0.51
Medicare 21 (35) 29 (33.7)
Medicaid 3 (5) 3 (3.5)
Self Pay 8 (13.3) 6 (7)
Primary Analysis: All Patients, Except Self Pay 52 80
Hospital Charges $70,430 ± $74,033 $53,514 ± $23,378 0.059
Hospital Revenue $35,043 ± $36,670 $25,329 ± $16,185 0.039
Total Hospital Costs $28,082 ± $31,453 $18,195 ± $9,242 0.009
Direct Costs $20,533 ± $23,405 $12,862 ± $6,797 0.007
Cath Lab $6,755 ± $3,727 $5,422 ± $2,026 0.009
Inpatient Nursing $5,664 ± $9,302 $3,706 ± $2,783 0.079
Surgery $3,269 ± $10,886 $401 ± $1,872 0.023
Pharmacy $2,501 ± $2,805 $1,842 ± $1,972 0.115
Respiratory $669 ± $1,819 $279 ± $965 0.111
Lab $471 ± $783 $198 ± $165 0.003
Emergency Room $421 ± $137 $514 ± $140 <0.001
Cardiology $235 ± $396 $265 ± $160 0.553
Imaging $205 ± $361 $92 ± $165 0.015
Supplies $213 ± $337 $131 ± $210 0.088
Other $128 ± $320 $12 ± $54 0.002
Indirect Costs $7,549 ± $8,069 $5,333 ± $2,565 0.024
Contribution Margin $14,511 ± $19,288 $12,467 ± $14,440 0.488
Net Income $6,962 ± $16,818 $7,134 ± $14,451 0.95BMC Cardiovascular Disorders 2009, 9:32 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2261/9/32
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The relationship between total hospital costs and insur-
ance payments is shown in Figure 3. For every $1000
reduction in costs, there was a $1009 reduction in insur-
ance payments. In the one-year follow-up, two patients
(one Private, one Medicare/Medicaid) from the Cardiol-
ogy Activation/Routine Transfer period and three patients
(two Private, one Self-Pay) from ED Activation/Immedi-
ate Transfer period had multiple STEMI hospitalizations.
Thus, a total of 50 patients were included in the one year
Cardiology Activation/Routine Transfer financial analysis
and 78 patients were included in the one year ED Activa-
tion/Immediate Transfer financial analysis. One-year fol-
low-up showed continuation in the patterns seen in the
initial hospitalization analysis with incremental reduc-
tions in insurance payments (hospital revenue) ultimately
exceeding $14,000 per patient with a slight numerical
decrease in hospital net income (Table 4 and Figure 4).
Private Insurance 28 48
Hospital Charges $71,248 ± $50,121 $52,564 ± $26,917 0.038
Hospital Revenue $46,500 ± $38,640 $33,005 ± $16,839 0.038
Total Hospital Costs $29,994 ± $30,970 $17,462 ± $10,059 0.012
Direct Costs $21,904 ± $22,709 $12,387 ± $7,406 0.009
Indirect Costs $8,090 ± $8,274 $5,075 ± $2,769 0.023
Contribution Margin $24,596 ± $20,316 $20,618 ± $12,668 0.296
Net Income $16,505 ± $16,403 $15,543 ± $11,638 0.766
Medicare/Medicaid 24 32
Hospital Charges $69,475 ± $95,930 $54,939 ± $17,053 0.403
Hospital Revenue $21,677 ± $29,711 $13,814 ± $3,095 0.142
Total Hospital Costs $25,850 ± $32,529 $19,294 ± $7,884 0.276
Direct Costs $18,933 ± $24,583 $13,575 ± $5,806 0.238
Indirect Costs $6,917 ± $7,951 $5,719 ± $2,211 0.419
Contribution Margin $2,745 ± $8,493 $239 ± $5,553 0.188
Net Income $-4,173 ± $8,430 $-5,479 ± $7,286 0.537
Contribution Margin = Hospital Revenue-Direct Costs. Net Income = Hospital Revenue-Total Hospital Costs. All values per hospital admission.
Table 1: Health Insurance Status, Hospital Revenues, Costs, and Profit Margins (Continued)
Outlier payments defined as hospital charges>$100,000 and  hospital revenue>$100,000 both decreased significantly with  adoption of the ED Activation/Immediate Transfer process Figure 1
Outlier payments defined as hospital 
charges>$100,000 and hospital revenue>$100,000 
both decreased significantly with adoption of the ED 
Activation/Immediate Transfer process.BMC Cardiovascular Disorders 2009, 9:32 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2261/9/32
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Discussion
Emergency department physician activation of the cathe-
terization lab and immediate transfer of the patient to an
immediately available catheterization lab by an in-house
nursing team leads to a substantial reduction in door-to-
balloon time and reductions in myocardial infarct size
and decreased length of stay [14]. With this improvement
in quality, total hospital costs decreased substantially for
the initial hospitalization and subsequent care within
one-year post-hospital discharge. However, payers had a
nearly $10,000 reduction in average payment per admis-
sion to our hospital with the reductions in total payments
increasing to more than $14,000 per patient in the one-
year follow-up. Thus, the decrease in total hospital costs
(Table 1) was offset by a nearly identical reduction in
insurance payments leading to no change in hospital net
Table 2: Diagnosis Related Groups and Diagnosis Related Group Relative Weights
Cardiology Activation
Routine Transfer
October 1, 2004–August 31, 2005
(N = 60)
ED Activation
Immediate Transfer
September 1, 2005–June 26, 2006
(N = 86)
N N P Value
Assigned DRG
(Adjusted 2006)
60 86
103 1 (1.7) 0 (0) 0.417
104 1 (1.7) 0 (0)
106 5 (8.3) 3 (3.5)
110 2 (3.3) 3 (3.5)
555 12 (20) 20 (23.3)
557 38 (63.3) 60 (69.8)
558 1 (1.7) 0 (0)
DRG Relative Weights
Primary Analysis: All Patients, Except Self Pay 52 80
Mean DRG Relative Weight (Unadjusted) 3.7479 ± 2.6731 2.9729 ± 0.8545 0.017
Mean DRG Relative Weight (2006 Weighting) 3.5979 ± 2.5718 2.9596 ± 0.8559 0.042
Private Insurance 28 48
Mean DRG Relative Weight (Unadjusted) 3.7695 ± 1.7542 2.9573 ± 0.8793 0.009
Mean DRG Relative Weight (2006 Weighting) 3.6449 ± 1.7502 2.9443 ± 0.8817 0.023
Medicare/Medicaid 24 32
Mean DRG Relative Weight (Unadjusted) 3.7226 ± 3.4972 2.9962 ± 0.8292 0.261
Mean DRG Relative Weight (2006 Weighting) 3.5430 ± 3.3263 2.9827 ± 0.8291 0.363
DRG = Diagnosis Related Group. DRG Relative Weight × Base Rate = Medicare payment. The drop in DRG relative weight with Medicare patients 
was 0.7264. Multiplied by St. Francis Hospital Base Rate of ~$5234 (average of $5171 for fiscal 2005 and $5297 for fiscal 2006) corresponds to 
reduction in payment of ~$3802 per admission for Medicare patients.BMC Cardiovascular Disorders 2009, 9:32 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2261/9/32
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income. Under current reimbursement practice, improve-
ments in quality by reducing door-to-balloon time lead to
considerable financial benefits which go entirely to pay-
ers.
As our study extended over nearly two years, the impact of
the introduction of the improved heart attack care model
on referral patterns could be a confounder in our results.
However, until June 2007, the hospital followed a strict
internal and external embargo on communications and
marketing related to the new heart attack program. Thus,
there were no internal communications or external mar-
keting of the heart attack program until after the publica-
tion of the original article in Circulation. The hospital did
develop a marketing campaign to the community regard-
ing the program but this was not introduced until January
2008. Thus, for the time period of the data of this study
(October 2004 to June 2006), only the hospital clinical
staff was aware of the existence of the program. Thus, we
do not believe there is any confounding of our results
from this issue, as the community remained unaware of
the heart attack program's existence.
One explanation of our findings could be that more
patients had "surgical" anatomy during the Cardiology
Activation/Routine Transfer period leading to more
patients assigned a surgery DRG, resulting in increased
resource utilization. Thus, our results would simply be
due from imbalances of baseline characteristics between
the two time periods. However, this was not the case as
the proportion of patients undergoing coronary artery
bypass grafting for complete revascularization was similar
between the two time periods. In addition, "surgery"
DRG's include not only coronary-artery bypass grafting
(DRG 106) but also ventricular assist device placement
(DRG 103), valve replacement (DRG 104), and intra-aor-
tic balloon pump placement (DRG 110) (Figure 2).
Review of the surgery DRG's and of the highest resource
utilization cases reveal that surgery (including non-CABG
procedures) was commonly used in response to the devel-
opment of post-myocardial infarction cardiogenic shock
and not simply for coronary artery bypass grafting to
allow for complete revascularization (Table 3). We have
shown previously that our ED Activation/Immediate
Transfer protocol leads to a substantial reduction in myo-
Wide variation in payments from Medicare for ST-elevation myocardial infarction despite prospective payment system Figure 2
Wide variation in payments from Medicare for ST-elevation myocardial infarction despite prospective pay-
ment system. It is widely assumed that payments from Medicare are "fixed" due to prospective payment system. However, a 
patient presenting with ST-elevation myocardial infarction can have a wide variety of clinical events, which ultimately determine 
the assigned DRG, and can lead to a nearly 20-fold variation in payment from Medicare. Addition of payments from the outlier 
payment system can lead to even larger variations in hospital revenue. (Fiscal 2007 Medicare DRG Relative Weights and 2007 
St. Francis Heart Center base rate of $5,238)BMC Cardiovascular Disorders 2009, 9:32 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2261/9/32
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cardial infarct size [14], and we believe that this may lead
to a resulting reduction in the incidence and severity of
cardiogenic shock.
From a hospital perspective, a "business case" for quality
has been advocated with the assertion that improved
quality will decrease the costs associated with delivering
patient care and improve hospital profitability [6-9].
However, most studies have focused primarily on the
effects of quality improvement on hospital costs with the
assumption that reductions in cost would lead directly to
improved profitability [16]. These analyses fail to account
for the impact of quality improvement on hospital reve-
nue, which also directly influences hospital profitability.
Although the quality improvement of reducing door-to-
balloon time did in fact lead to substantial reductions in
total hospital costs per admission, our data show that it
also dramatically decreased reimbursement levels com-
pletely negating what would otherwise be seen as quite
large hospital cost reductions. Thus, quality improvement
can have unintended consequences and paradoxically
worsen hospital profitability. In fact, similar results were
experienced by Intermountain Healthcare which found its
profit margin on Medicare patients with pneumonia dis-
appear with implementation of extensive quality
improvement [17]. In addition, studies have focused on
comparisons of profitability between patients with high
quality and low quality care with the expectation that
quality improvement can shift the financial performance
of costly low quality care to that of high quality care [7,8].
However, as shown in Figure 4, reducing door-to-balloon
time decreased revenue more than costs leading to a mod-
est decrease in hospital net income. For these reasons, it is
difficult to make a "business case" for quality improve-
ment through reducing door-to-balloon time from a hos-
pital perspective.
Table 3: Characteristics of Patients with "Surgery" Diagnosis Related Groups
ED Activation/Immediate 
Transfer
IRA Cardiogenic Shock Left Main 3-V-CAD Primary Surgery DRG Weight Total Charges
NO RCA Yes Yes No CABG, VAD 19.5514 $516,563
NO LAD Yes No No MVR, Aneurysm Resection 7.9180 $282,179
NO LAD No Yes Yes CABG 7.3062 $64,707
NO RCA No No Yes CABG 7.3062 $100,666
NO RCA Yes No Yes CABG 7.3062 $149,503
NO RCA No No Yes CABG 7.3062 $76,475
NO RCA No Yes Yes CABG 7.3062 $79,628
NO LAD Yes No No IABP 3.9587 $64,640
NO LAD Yes No No IABP 3.9587 $125,504
YES LAD No No Yes CABG 7.0346 $83,786
YES LCx Yes No No CABG 7.0346 $208,978
YES LAD No Yes No CABG 7.0346 $97,339
YES LAD Yes No No IABP 3.9587 $51,238
YES RCA Yes Yes Yes IABP 3.8417 $69,931
YES LAD Yes No No IABP 3.8417 $91,175
Review of the "surgery" DRG's and of the highest resource utilization cases reveal that surgery (including non-CABG procedures) was commonly 
used in response to the development of post-myocardial infarction cardiogenic shock and not simply for coronary artery bypass grafting to allow 
for complete revascularization.
IRA = Infarct Related Artery, 3-V-CAD = Three Vessel Coronary Artery, DRG = Diagnosis Related Group, LAD = Left Anterior Descending 
Artery, LCX = Left Circumflex, Rca = Right Coronary Artery, CABG = Coronary Artery Bypass Grafting, VAD = Ventricular Assist Device, MVR 
= Mitral Valve Replacement, IABP = Intra-aortic Balloon PumpBMC Cardiovascular Disorders 2009, 9:32 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2261/9/32
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Table 4: One-Year Financial Outcomes: Combination of Initial Hospitalization with All Hospital Encounters One Year Post-Hospital 
Discharge
Cardiology Activation
Routine Transfer
October 1, 2004–August 31, 2005
(N = 60)
ED Activation
Immediate Transfer
September 1, 2005–June 26, 2006
(N = 86)
N N P Value
Primary Analysis: All Patients, Except Self Pay 50 78
Hospital Charges $101,862 ± $92,919 $77,215 ± $41,706 0.043
Hospital Revenue $49,959 ± $53,741 $35,937 ± $23,125 0.044
Total Hospital Costs $39,974 ± $37,434 $26,778 ± $15,561 0.007
Direct Costs $29,031 ± $27,568 $18,967 ± $11,831 0.005
Indirect Costs $10,943 ± $9,909 $7,811 ± $4,021 0.014
Contribution Margin $20,928 ± $35,469 $16,970 ± $19,149 0.415
Net Income $9,984 ± $32,175 $9,159 ± $18,847 0.855
Private 27 46
Hospital Charges $102,819 ± $87,766 $74,161 ± $36,177 0.054
Hospital Revenue $65,953 ± $63,761 $45,795 ± $23,514 0.057
Total Hospital Costs $40,910 ± $38,307 $25,200 ± $13,850 0.014
Direct Costs $29,783 ± $27,977 $17,716 ± $9,854 0.009
Indirect Costs $11,127 ± $10,346 $7,484 ± $4,093 0.037
Contribution Margin $36,170 ± $41,985 $28,079 ± $16,770 0.249
Net Incomes $25,043 ± $35,906 $20,595 ± $14,920 0.461
Medicare/Medicaid 23 32
Hospital Charges $100,738 ± $100,621 $81,605 ± $48,855 0.354
Hospital Revenue $31,183 ± $30,749 $21,765 ± $13,196 0.127
Total Hospital Costs $38,876 ± $37,209 $29,047 ± $17,719 0.197
Direct Costs $28,147 ± $27,681 $20,765 ± $14,180 0.201
Indirect Costs $10,729 ± $9,597 $8,282 ± $3,933 0.199
Contribution Margin $3,035 ± $9,950 $1,000 ± $7,492 0.391
Net Income $-7,693 ± $13,309 $-7,281 ± $9,277 0.893BMC Cardiovascular Disorders 2009, 9:32 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2261/9/32
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The Institute of Medicine has recommended that payment
systems financially reward the delivery of high quality
care [1]. However, current hospital reimbursement prac-
tices have limited ability to reward improvements in hos-
pital quality [1,18]. Specifically, for reducing door-to-
balloon time, current reimbursement practices financially
penalize hospitals for quality improvement as shown in
our study. Most hospitals set their charges in a manner
directly proportional to their underlying costs [19,20].
Thus, a quality improvement such as reducing door-to-
balloon time, which reduces the hospital's costs, will typ-
ically automatically reduce the hospital's charges.
Although their importance in hospital payments has
diminished, hospital charges remain a component of
many private payer contracts and are explicitly used in for-
mulas to calculate outlier payments for Medicare and
Medicaid and certain private payers [20,21]. Thus, the
reduction in hospital charges will automatically reduce
payments from many private payers contracts. Further-
more, the reduction in hospital charges will cause a reduc-
tion in outlier payments as seen in our study (Figure 1)
[21].
With the advent of the prospective payment system, fixed
payments to hospitals were intended to encourage hospi-
tals to improve efficiency and quality resulting in financial
benefits to their bottom line [22]. However, as seen in Fig-
ure 2, a patient with STEMI can have a wide variation in
assigned DRG depending on the in-hospital clinical
course ultimately leading to a nearly 20-fold variation in
Medicare payment. Our study reveals that an improve-
ment in door-to-balloon time leads to a decrease in DRG
relative weight. Since Medicare/Medicaid payments are
directly linked to DRG relative weight, hospital payments
from Medicare/Medicaid dropped by more than $7,000
per hospital admission, which was proportionally similar
to the reduction seen with private payers. In addition, the
prospective payment system was designed primarily to
reflect the hospital's costs of taking care of patients [23].
Thus, since our costs decreased, the payment system, in
accordance with its specific design, reduced our hospital's
reimbursements. These findings underscore major struc-
tural limitations in the prospective payment system when
it comes to rewarding quality in acute myocardial infarc-
tion care. With the advent in 2008 of Medicare Severity
DRG's, Medicare's linkage between costs and payment
will further increase [24]. In addition, as more private pay-
ers adopt DRG based fixed payments similar to Medicare,
this structural limitation in payment for improved quality
will become more pervasive [20].
Relationship between total hospital costs and insurance pay- ments (hospital revenue) for study cohort Figure 3
Relationship between total hospital costs and insur-
ance payments (hospital revenue) for study cohort. 
There was a linear relationship between total hospital costs 
and insurance payments (hospital revenue); for every $1,000 
reduction in total hospital costs, there was $1,009 reduction 
in insurance payments (hospital revenue). Thus, even with a 
significant proportion of patients treated by prospective pay-
ment (Medicare/Medicaid), there remains a strong relation-
ship between costs and revenue. Dashed lines are 95% 
confidence intervals.
Time course of financial outcomes from payer and hospital  perspective Figure 4
Time course of financial outcomes from payer and 
hospital perspective. (A) After the index hospitalization, 
there was a more than $10,000 reduction in insurance pay-
ments (hospital revenue) per patient. (B) After one year of 
follow-up, the reduction in insurance payments (hospital rev-
enue) increased to greater than $14,000 per patient. (C) 
Despite marked improvement in hospital cost structure 
(Tables 1 and 3), hospital net income showed a slight numer-
ical decrease as the decrease in revenue exceeded the cost 
reductions. Post-discharge one-year financial data include 
both outpatient and inpatient hospital encounters.BMC Cardiovascular Disorders 2009, 9:32 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2261/9/32
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Purchasers and payers of healthcare have asserted that
improved quality can reduce the cost of care [5]. Our
study validates the relationship between reducing door to
balloon time and reducing costs from a payer perspective.
Yet, our study highlights a shortcoming of current reim-
bursement practices where the financial investments in
quality programs by providers lead to large financial ben-
efits to other parties [25]. However, given the potential
large financial benefits to payers, greater emphasis on
improving door-to-balloon time in pay for performance
may be warranted to increase the economic rate of return
of these programs. To be successful, a mechanism for
shifting the benefits from payers to hospitals will be nec-
essary [25]. Specifically, reduction in door-to-balloon
time may be an appropriate target for innovative pro-
grams such as funding of startup costs by payers [26]. It
also may be an appropriate area for the development of
gain-sharing programs between payers, hospitals, and
physicians [27].
Limitations
Our results reflect the experience of one tertiary care com-
munity hospital and may not be applicable to other types
of institutions or the healthcare system as a whole. Further
studies involving other institutions and government and
private payer databases will be required for confirmation
of our results. Hospitals with different payer mixes and
hospitals outside the United States may have different
results. Although the two cohorts were similar from a
demographic, presentation, and treatment standpoint,
hidden baseline differences cannot be completely
accounted for between the two time periods due to the
non-randomized nature of our study. Our study failed to
account for startup and maintenance costs. Addition of
these costs would further increase the financial losses to
the hospital. Our study failed to account for potential sec-
ondary financial benefits to our hospital for reducing
door-to-balloon time such as enhanced reputation,
improved patient throughput due to decreased length of
stay, or the possibility of improved future reimbursements
due to improved quality of care. Finally, our study reflects
financial outcomes from reducing door-to-balloon time
with emergency department physician activation of the
catheterization lab and an immediate transfer process;
improvements in door-to-balloon time by other methods
may lead to different results.
Conclusion
Emergency department activation of the catheterization
lab and immediate transfer of the patient to an immedi-
ately available catheterization lab by an in-house transfer
team led to dramatic reductions in door-to-balloon time
with resulting decreases in myocardial infarction size and
length of stay. Irrespective of the results of this financial
study, widespread adoption of this strategy by cardiolo-
gists and hospitals is warranted due to its clinical benefits
to patients with STEMI. From a payer perspective, this spe-
cific improvement in quality does dramatically reduce the
overall cost of care. However, from a hospital perspective,
there is limited financial incentive to adopt this program.
To provide financial incentive to adopt this quality
improvement, payment mechanisms designed to finan-
cially support the adoption of this program and to shift
the economic benefits from payers to hospitals are
needed.
An electronic copy of the order set used in the EHART®
protocol is available for download at http://www.stfran
cishospitals.org/heart/.
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